{"id":1767,"date":"2025-08-28T13:00:00","date_gmt":"2025-08-28T11:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cnrs.org.ua\/security-guarantees-options-for-ukraine\/"},"modified":"2025-09-01T18:50:45","modified_gmt":"2025-09-01T16:50:45","slug":"security-guarantees-options-for-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cnrs.org.ua\/en\/security-guarantees-options-for-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Security Guarantees: Options for Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In a recent publication by the Centre for the Study of National Resilience, particular attention
was devoted to the relationship between allies \u2014 or the absence thereof \u2014 and the
availability of security guarantees for Ukraine<\/a>. It was precisely the absence, as of 2014, of
genuine allied relations with any state that became one of the decisive factors behind the
occupation of Crimea and the launch of Russia\u2019s treacherous aggression in eastern Ukraine.
This vulnerability was not overlooked by the aggressor and played a significant role again
eight years later during the full-scale invasion of February 2022. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

That deficit of formal alliances endures today, not least because in the spring of 2022,
European governments and societies were paralyzed by the shocking images of the
destruction of Mariupol, the devastation of other Ukrainian towns and villages, and the
atrocities committed in Bucha and across dozens of temporarily occupied settlements.
Moscow correctly calculated that such instruments of terror \u2014 reinforced by nuclear saber-
rattling \u2014 would dissuade Europeans from becoming directly involved in a confrontation with
Russia. Indeed, it pressed them to avoid, at almost any cost, agreements on military
assistance to Ukraine. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This mirrors, in some respects, Nazi Germany\u2019s tactics of 1939\u20131940, when it deliberately
circulated images of Warsaw and other Polish cities reduced to rubble, with the intent of
intimidating European capitals. That approach proved e\ufb00ective at the time, as the so-
called Phoney War on the Western Front tragically demonstrated. It appears the Kremlin, too,
has found such methods highly e\ufb00ective.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So far, the only substantive step toward allied relations in recent years has been
the Agreement on a Century of Partnership between Ukraine and the United Kingdom,
signed in January 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukraine, therefore, must approach the issue of acquiring allies with realism, built on three
fundamental premises:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. A shared threat emanating from Putin\u2019s Russia. That authoritarian regimes pursue
aggressive policies is now axiomatic, and Moscow itself obligingly rea\ufb03rms this
through constant provocations against its neighbors. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Shared democratic values and, crucially, the determination to defend them. It was
precisely Europe\u2019s lack of resolve in resisting totalitarianism that enabled the
aggressive ambitions of the Berlin\u2013Rome\u2013Tokyo axis in the late 1930s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Common, mutually beneficial aspirations for the political and economic development
of their nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At present, the question of securing reliable allies for Ukraine requires both an expert
discussion and urgent, coordinated action. Needless to say, a coherent and predictable
foreign policy is an essential precondition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Equally important is recognition of a hard truth that no state is likely to bind itself to Ukraine
until Kyiv strengthens its national resilience, bolsters its economy, and builds a formidable
military. As Niccol\u00f2 Machiavelli observed, \u201cHe who commands a strong army will invariably
find strong allies.\u201d Those words remain as pertinent today as they were five centuries ago. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a result of the August Washington meetings, it seems the agreement on the need to
establish security guarantees for Ukraine has been reached. While their precise content
remains unclear, it is obviously crucial that they are practical, not merely declarative.
Encouragingly, early indications suggest those may involve four elements: military
contingents; air defense systems; a continued flow of armaments; and monitoring of
ceasefire agreements. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is critical that such guarantees rest upon firm political will and on pre-agreed mechanisms
for coordinated action. They must avoid the pitfalls of September 1939, when neither Britain
nor France had coherent plans to aid Poland, thereby condemning it to swift defeat. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

From a strategic perspective, two imperatives lie before Ukraine: <\/p>\n\n\n\n