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Thursday, February 6, 2025

Consequences of the Crocus Hall Massacre: a Course on Intensification of Repression and Legitimization of Torture

The tragic March 22 event at the Crocus Concert and Entertainment Center opened the discussion on a variety of versions of what really happened that Friday night in Moscow. Among the main ones are an attack by the ISIS terrorists and a false flag operation by the Russian special services to be pinned on Ukraine. The purpose of the latter would be to sow fear among average Russians, thus, preparing them for the increasing internal repression and mobilization measures; justify current and future attacks against civilian targets in Ukraine; lay ground for the overall escalation of hostilities; and to try to engage Western countries in the so-called joint fight against international terrorism.

There is little doubt that Moscow is, indeed, desperate to divert attention from the more than obvious failure of its security services that seem to be called that only for being capable of brute force against minuscule opposition at home and assassinations abroad, but clearly incapable of protecting public safety. So, to that end, finding a “Ukrainian footprint” would certainly come in very handy. The obvious proof of the intent is the categorical in manner and unsubstantiated in essence claims of Ukraine’s alleged involvement in the attack on Russian propaganda channels and in the words of Russian officials, including Russian Security Council Secretary Patrushev, who on March 26 directly stated that it was “of course, Ukraine.” On March 3, the same nonsense was officially repeated by the Russian defense minister.

Meanwhile, regional or sub-regional security structures under the auspices or with the participation of the Russian Federation have proved to be completely amorphous. The so-called “coordination of interaction between the competent authorities of the CIS member states in the field of combating terrorism”, including within the framework of the relevant Anti-Terrorist Center, as well as “building up joint efforts to increase the effectiveness of the fight against international terrorism” of the CSTO member states have proved to be a clear failure.

At the same time, while trying to play up to ultra-nationalist and xenophobic social sentiments and further intimidate the regime opponents by the demonstrative show of torture of detainees and those accused of organizing the attack, Moscow has made several important mistakes:

First of all, the whole world has seen the now unequivocal evidence of the widespread practice of torture by the Russian special services, as repeatedly stated by international organizations and prisoners themselves, including Ukrainian POWs and civilians.

Secondly, it has become a litmus test for the Russian society’s latent deep-rooted racism, based on its traditional distrust and rejection of anything foreign and different. The culture of domestic violence inherent in Russia easily found its supporters in the state bodies, including the enforcement structures, that have long perceived it as completely normal. In fact, almost 200 years ago, in his critical book La Russie en 1839 , the famous Frenchman Astolphe de Custine observed: “To beat a man to death in broad daylight, in a crowded street, before he is even tried in court — that is what seems quite natural to the public and the police in St.Petersburg.”

Thirdly, the video broadcast of brutal torture and abuse of detained Muslims may have a highly negative resonance throughout the Muslim world, that doesn’t like to see the fellow believers oppressed. That in turn, may at the very minimum, complicate Russia’s entire course onto prioritizing relations with the countries of the Global South or, as they are now referred to in Moscow, the “world majority.” The situation is not unlike the high-profile 2004 scandal when evidence of the US servicemen humiliating prisoners at the Iraqi Abu Ghraib prison became public, not only undermining the US reputation in Iraq, but also compromising its entire policy in the Middle East, Africa and many parts of Asia and to this day, remaining a dark spot on Washington’s image

Fourth, the consequences of the persecution campaign against migrants from Tajikistan and several other countries launched by the Russian authorities may backfire. It is likely that the policy will contribute to the radicalization of some Russian Muslims, whose numbers in recent years have been growing. Especially since Moscow itself is becoming a significant continental center of Islam, with the number of followers in the Russian capital already approaching 4 million. Naturally, that may also lead to strengthening of the anti-Russian sentiment in Central Asian countries, where despite Moscow’s longstanding and widespread presence, the underlying processes remain little understood by the modern Russian establishment.

Finally, the resulting outflow of a large number of migrant workers from the Russian Federation, where the shortage of labor resources has reached 5 million, according to estimates, is bound to negatively affect its economy. The situation in the construction industry is particularly dire. And precisely for that reason, it is possible that the Russian authorities will eventually “sweep everything under the rug,” since truth is, Russian economy cannot function without migrants.

Meanwhile, the terrorist state itself is creeping deeper and deeper back into the dark times directly reminiscent of the bloodiest years of Stalin’s terror. As the aforementioned “security forces” will now voice their loyalty to Putin’s regime even more loudly, the growing repressions will be most likely followed by the expansion of the so-called “nationalization,” that is, confiscation of businesses owned by foreigners and those not sufficiently loyal to the Kremlin. Considering the dwindling resources of the National Welfare Fund formed at the expense of oil and gas revenues, whose liquid assets as of January 1, 2024, fell from $113.5 to $55.9 billion, the Kremlin is actively eyeing additional reserves for financing the war. Therefore, we should also not rule out confiscation of personal property, including real estate, vehicles and especially foreign currency, and other ordinary citizens personal savings. However, that Kremlin’s course is inevitably leading the Russian Federation to further accumulation of crisis trends in both its economy and society.


Author: Oleh Bielokolos, Director of the Center for National Resilience Studies

Our mission is to formulate and promote the Ukrainian vision of national resilience: the interconnection with democratic values, human rights, international cooperation, regional and global security.

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