In a recent publication by the Centre for the Study of National Resilience, particular attention
was devoted to the relationship between allies — or the absence thereof — and the
availability of security guarantees for Ukraine. It was precisely the absence, as of 2014, of
genuine allied relations with any state that became one of the decisive factors behind the
occupation of Crimea and the launch of Russia’s treacherous aggression in eastern Ukraine.
This vulnerability was not overlooked by the aggressor and played a significant role again
eight years later during the full-scale invasion of February 2022.
That deficit of formal alliances endures today, not least because in the spring of 2022,
European governments and societies were paralyzed by the shocking images of the
destruction of Mariupol, the devastation of other Ukrainian towns and villages, and the
atrocities committed in Bucha and across dozens of temporarily occupied settlements.
Moscow correctly calculated that such instruments of terror — reinforced by nuclear saber-
rattling — would dissuade Europeans from becoming directly involved in a confrontation with
Russia. Indeed, it pressed them to avoid, at almost any cost, agreements on military
assistance to Ukraine.
This mirrors, in some respects, Nazi Germany’s tactics of 1939–1940, when it deliberately
circulated images of Warsaw and other Polish cities reduced to rubble, with the intent of
intimidating European capitals. That approach proved effective at the time, as the so-
called Phoney War on the Western Front tragically demonstrated. It appears the Kremlin, too,
has found such methods highly effective.
So far, the only substantive step toward allied relations in recent years has been
the Agreement on a Century of Partnership between Ukraine and the United Kingdom,
signed in January 2025.
Ukraine, therefore, must approach the issue of acquiring allies with realism, built on three
fundamental premises:
1. A shared threat emanating from Putin’s Russia. That authoritarian regimes pursue
aggressive policies is now axiomatic, and Moscow itself obligingly reaffirms this
through constant provocations against its neighbors.
2. Shared democratic values and, crucially, the determination to defend them. It was
precisely Europe’s lack of resolve in resisting totalitarianism that enabled the
aggressive ambitions of the Berlin–Rome–Tokyo axis in the late 1930s.
3. Common, mutually beneficial aspirations for the political and economic development
of their nations.
At present, the question of securing reliable allies for Ukraine requires both an expert
discussion and urgent, coordinated action. Needless to say, a coherent and predictable
foreign policy is an essential precondition.
Equally important is recognition of a hard truth that no state is likely to bind itself to Ukraine
until Kyiv strengthens its national resilience, bolsters its economy, and builds a formidable
military. As Niccolò Machiavelli observed, “He who commands a strong army will invariably
find strong allies.” Those words remain as pertinent today as they were five centuries ago.
As a result of the August Washington meetings, it seems the agreement on the need to
establish security guarantees for Ukraine has been reached. While their precise content
remains unclear, it is obviously crucial that they are practical, not merely declarative.
Encouragingly, early indications suggest those may involve four elements: military
contingents; air defense systems; a continued flow of armaments; and monitoring of
ceasefire agreements.
It is critical that such guarantees rest upon firm political will and on pre-agreed mechanisms
for coordinated action. They must avoid the pitfalls of September 1939, when neither Britain
nor France had coherent plans to aid Poland, thereby condemning it to swift defeat.
From a strategic perspective, two imperatives lie before Ukraine:
- First, to conclude a legally binding mutual defense treaty with a nuclear power,
complemented by agreements with regional partners, ensuring assistance in the event
of unprovoked aggression. Such commitments, unmistakably defensive in nature,
would embed Ukraine’s security within the wider framework of European security. - Second, to continue strengthening its own deterrent capabilities. The precise
constitution of these forces must be addressed separately and discreetly. As the
famous Ukrainian diplomat and writer Yuri Shcherbak once presciently remarked: “The
next doomsday device is artificial intelligence.”
Another indispensable pillar of our security remains national resilience, defined as the
capacity of institutions, civil society, and the public to resist shocks — both expected and
unforeseen.
Finally, we must always remember that the anti-Ukrainian ideology and practice of today’s
Kremlin’s clique leaves us few options. So, the ultimate guarantee of Ukraine’s security is the
comprehensive dismantling of Russia’s current regime, the unequivocal international
condemnation of Putinism, and the radical transformation of Russian state and society.
Otherwise, the Damoclean sword of invasion from the East will forever hang over us.
by Oleh Bielokolos,
Director of the Centre for the Study of National Resilience