It is highly probable that the new US Administration will consider the Ukrainian-Russian war within the much broader context of American-Russian relations, including strategic stability and future interactions with NATO allies.
But what does strategic stability mean in today’s world, and how have previous administrations approached this critically important yet intricate issue? Arguably, the most effective definition of the term, that has numerous interpretations, characterizes interstate relations in the realm of strategic arms where neither side has genuine incentives for a first nuclear strike. The New START Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, set to expire in a year, currently plays a pivotal role in that context.
As is widely known, on April 8, 2010, the US-Russian Treaty on Further Measures for the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also referred to as the 2010 Prague Treaty, START III, or New START Treaty, was signed in Prague. According to its provisions, each party is required to reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, and nuclear weapons of heavy bombers (HB) so that seven years after the Treaty’s entry into force and thereafter, their total number does not exceed:
- 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers
- 1,550 warheads for those
- 800 units of both deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.
The Parties also committed to exchanging data and conducting appropriate verification of the Treaty’s implementation. Concurrently, each party determines the structure of its strategic offensive weapons and is prohibited from deploying them outside its national territory.
In 2018 though, the Russian Federation began acting contrary to the spirit of both the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Prague Treaty. Specifically, on March 1, 2018, Russia announced its plans to develop a “new generation of intercontinental missiles,” “stealth cruise missiles,” “unmanned underwater vehicles,” “hypersonic airborne missile system,” “gliding wing unit,” “combat laser systems,” and more. One would be hard-pressed to present the world with a more irresponsible and unambiguous threat to international security in general, and the arms control system in particular.
Notably, during Trump’s first presidential term, the United States advocated for the preparation of a new international agreement on nuclear arms control, to which China would also become a party. However, Beijing declined to participate in the relevant negotiations with Moscow and Washington. Recognizing that any agreement akin to START III would necessitate the provision of detailed and comprehensive information on nuclear weapons and, particularly, their actual locations, Beijing was and remains apparently apprehensive that this would leave it vulnerable to a potential attack, and remains unwilling to assume responsibility or make any concessions in the matter.
The Trump Administration also deemed it necessary to enhance the treaty’s verification mechanism, i.e., to verify the implementation of its provisions, particularly in light of Moscow’s tendency to very selectively fulfill its international obligations. The US also advocated for control over the development and deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), justifiably considering them a threat to peace in Europe. In general, the US Administration believed that the conventional division of nuclear weapons into “strategic” and “tactical” was a remnant of Cold War approaches and insisted on establishing effective control over all types of nuclear weapons.
It is worth noting that during the Cold War, the Soviet leadership actually viewed TNWs as a means of ensuring faster success in conventional warfare theaters, and thus, as a much more practical combat tool than strategic weapons. Meanwhile, in Western Europe, Soviet TNWs were viewed equivalent to strategic ones in terms of both their range and the devastating consequences of their potential use. So, it is no coincidence that almost since its formation as an independent state in 1991, the Russian Federation has refused to even discuss the issue of any TNWs restrictions. Today, we can see how the proposal of the previous Trump Administration would have benefited Ukraine, as according to various sources, Moscow currently possesses between 1,000 and 2,000 non-strategic/tactical nuclear warheads.
Russia, on the other hand, sought to preserve the 2010 Prague Treaty, which effectively provided it with the prestige of a global superpower and the privileged status of a second geopolitical center of power. There is little doubt that it would also like to once again proclaim itself the guarantor of international peace and security.
Therefore, it actually played to Moscow’s advantage when, following Biden’s election victory, in February 2021 the US agreed to extend START III without any amendments or additions for another five years, until February 5, 2026. It is likely that at the time, the White House hoped that this step would be seen as America’s sincere attempt to reduce tensions between the two superpowers, that in truth though, had been caused primarily by Moscow’s provocative actions.
Clearly, that was a Biden Administration’s mistake. As a result, as part of its generally aggressive foreign policy course, Russia began to act even more irresponsibly, openly employing nuclear rhetoric as a way of blackmailing the US and the world. In early 2023, the RF unilaterally refused to conduct both the envisaged inspections and consultations on the START III implementation mechanism. On February 21, 2023, the Kremlin declared the suspension of Russia’s participation in the US-Russian Treaty on Further Measures for the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
In May 2023, it was announced that Iskander-M systems would be transferred to Belarus, that certain Belarusian Su-25 aircraft would be given the technical capability to carry nuclear weapons, and that the Ministries of Defense of the Russian Federation and Belarus would sign documents defining the procedure for storing Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. Furthermore, the RF has begun to openly state that “it’s a task of paramount importance for Russia to instill in the US and EU elites a fear of a real full-scale war – the Third World War… This is the only thing that can stabilize the situation now. When Europe and the United States start talking about bomb shelters and homemade gauze bandages, then their authorities will begin to de-escalate and engage in dialogue with Moscow.”
In response, in June 2023, the United States announced that it would cease exchanging information with Russia; refuse to provide Moscow with reports on the status and deployment of relevant types of weapons; suspend inspections on US territory; and stop providing telemetry data on launches of US intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles. Evidently, the American leadership also saw through the Russian diplomats and military personnel’s rather primitive attempts of using flights to the US, ostensibly for START III inspections, to conduct intelligence operations in the NATO countries airspace that has been closed for Russia since 2022.
Against the backdrop of the US State Department’s official recognition of Russia’s violations of START III, in 2024, Washington began considering the production of a new W93 nuclear warhead for intercontinental submarine-launched missiles, and in January 2025, announced the deployment of updated B61-12 gravity bombs in Europe.
Overall, though, the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric appears to have been effective — since February 2022, the United States has repeatedly stressed the importance of avoiding further escalation. Moreover, in light of Washington’s timid response, the past two years have witnessed the emergence of an aggressive, authoritarian, nuclear-armed Moscow-Minsk-Pyongyang axis stretching across Eurasia from NATO’s eastern borders to the DPRK-Republic of Korea demarcation line in the Far East. Obviously, North Korea could potentially launch a nuclear strike not only on its southern neighbor, but also on Japan, and, possibly with Russian assistance, is working diligently to improve the means of delivering nuclear weapons to the US. In the future, this authoritarian trio could potentially be strengthened by the inclusion of Iran, transforming it into an extremely dangerous and highly unpredictable nuclear quartet. Consequently, it is evident that while Biden Administration’s policy of preventing escalation has largely failed, no foundation for new agreements on strategic offensive arms limitation can be currently seen on the horizon.
Several other considerations also suggest that START III is unlikely to be extended in its current form. Since 2010, some areas directly related to defense have undergone significant changes, primarily associated with the rapid proliferation and continuous improvement of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); the development of hypersonic technologies, that are considered both in the context of developing nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and as an element of non-nuclear deterrence; the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in various weapons, including nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, as well as in the analysis of large databases and decision-making; and finally, the militarization of outer space, that is already regarded as a potential battlefield.
For now, it remains uncertain what position the Trump Administration will adopt on the aforementioned issues, especially against the backdrop of the growing threats from Russia to use nuclear weapons, particularly in Europe, and its active attempts to form a global anti-Western coalition. Regardless, it has become apparent that today, nuclear deterrence works for only one side — Russia.
There is reason to believe that the new US Administration will focus on resuming uranium enrichment for military purposes, constructing new production facilities and laboratories, and deeply modernizing existing ones to this end. Proposals have been put forward to replace some old nuclear warheads with new ones, while work is underway to create and modernize appropriate delivery vehicles, including sea-launched cruise missiles. At this point, these and other nuclear deterrence measures are planned through the mid-2030s. In addition, nuclear programs now begin utilizing new supercomputers, such as El Capitan in California and Venado in Los Alamos.
Meanwhile, however, we must acknowledge the absence of the fundamental prerequisite for any strategic stability negotiations: a climate of mutual trust between the parties, the lack of which stands as the most critical impediment to productive political dialogue.
Oleh Bielokolos
Director of the Center for National Resilience Studies